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Introduction  
The immediate post-conflict phase provides a unique if limited window of opportunity to initiate 
systemic change in the education sector.
1
 Such reforms are vital to long-term conflict transformation 
because education replicates and reproduces the core values and practices of the political system;
2
 it 
provides new generations with an understanding of past violence and of the mechanisms in place to 
redress it;
3
 and its delivery affects directly or indirectly most of the population, and has an important 
symbolic and practical function related to inclusion, social mobility and communal equality in the 
aftermath of conflict.
4
  
Most educational intervention to date have not explicitly embedded education in a wider strategy of 
development for peacebuilding.
5
 The recent emphasis on educational decentralisation may be an 
exception: partly due to the influence of the World Bank and IMF, there is widespread consensus 
that decentralisation is an important element in educational reform strategies worldwide.
6
 
Decentralisation may be even more crucial in post-conflict societies because the decentralisation of 
educational design and delivery affects the state’s ‘ability to cope with the dual problems of policy 
conflict and the erosion of its own legitimacy’.
7
 However, the literature also points at the ambiguous 
effects of educational decentralisation on post-conflict societies, warning that it may ‘reinforce 
ethnic divisions if it is not moderated by strong institutions at the national level’.
8
 Fundamental 
questions remain: is decentralisation ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for education in post-conflict societies? Does it 
enable local governments to employ schools for long-term conflict transformation? Under which 
conditions?  
This paper employs rich and detailed qualitative data about Lebanon, Northern Ireland and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereafter, Macedonia) to shed some light on one of the 
ways in which local government can contribute to peace: through the provision of formal education. 
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It suggests that the power of local government to design and deliver educational services which 
decisively contribute to conflict management are mediated by two factors, previously overlooked by 
the literature: the model of decentralisation adopted in the aftermath of conflict and the decision-
making model at the centre.  
This article first presents the existing literature on educational decentralisation. It then introduces 
the methods and case studies. The bulk of the article analyses three examples of education services 
in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia, respectively: the reform of the Lebanese University, 
the establishment of Northern Ireland’s Education and Skills Authority, and the rationalisation of 
Macedonia’s school network. The final section concludes and maps avenues for further 
research.Several acronyms will be used throughout the article. Table 1 lists them in alphabetical 
order. 
 
Table 1: Acronyms 
 
Educational Decentralisation: Review of the Literature 
Decentralisation is often portrayed as a panacea: a key to the reform of education systems 
worldwide
9
 as well as ‘a useful mechanism in reducing both ethnic conflict and secessionism’.
10
  
However, studies of educational decentralisation often overlook Lauglo’s assertion that 
‘decentralisation should not be thought of as a unitary concept’.
11
  
Indeed, there are numerous approaches to decentralisation in general, and to educational 
decentralisation in particular.
12
 Most importantly, educational decentralisation may be territorial or 
non-territorial (functional). This is because decentralisation is not only a spatial concept, but has also 
important hierarchical implications in the case of education systems, in which the centre is also 
generally the apex of decision-making.
13
 Thus, non-territorial decentralisation entails a transfer of 
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authority to parallel ‘parastatal, nongovernmental or private agencies’.
14
 Territorial decentralisation 
conversely implies redistribution of power ‘from higher to lower geographical tiers of government’.
15
  
Moreover, decentralisation encompasses both delegation and devolution. Delegation implies the 
transfer of management and administrative responsibilities to local actors under the direction of 
local government.
16
 In this sense, it approximates deconcentration, as a weak form of 
decentralisation which may ‘merely shift responsibilities from central government officials in the 
capital city to those working in regions, provinces or districts’.
17
 In contrast, devolution entails the 
transfer of all decision-making and managerial powers over specific matters (such as education) to 
the local level.
18
 But how do different models of decentralisation impact on local government’s 
scope for contributing to conflict management? This question is overlooked by the existing 
literature. 
In fact, the dominant discourse holds that– regardless of its approach – educational decentralisation 
would benefit post-conflict societies in three main respects. First, decentralisation would reproduce 
at the local level central decision-making and foster representative, transparent and peaceful 
policymaking.
19
 Accountable and responsive design and delivery of educational services would 
enhance state legitimacy.
20
 It may also foster conflict transformation by eroding  existing inequalities 
and patterns of patronage, thereby promoting social mobility and long-term equality among 
previously warring groups.
21
 
Second, Weiler identifies the ‘efficiency argument’, portraying decentralisation as increasing 
efficiency and rationalisation of educational provision.
22
 it is widely accepted that the delivery of 
education immediately after a violent conflict provides ‘an early peace dividend’ and entrenches the 
legitimacy of a peace process.
23
 The efficient delivery of education could also enhance policy 
legitimacy.
24
  
Third, decentralisation would allow ‘spatially concentrated minority ethnic groups’ to protect their 
distinctive identities, cultures and resources.
25
 Separate schools catering for children of different 
backgrounds could hamper long-term conflict transformation due to a combination of structural 
factors, curricular contents and unequal long-term opportunities.
26
 However, multi-lingual education 
(combining mother tongue education with advanced teaching of the state language), may promote 
the inclusion of linguistic minorities and their long-term socio-economic equality.
27
 Similarly, ethno-
national communities could gain an opportunity to contribute to reform of curriculum contents and 
pedagogical approaches, which remain crucial to the conflict-mitigating potential of education.
28
 
These initiatives would address the root causes of conflict by ensuring the self-management of 
previously warring communities and allaying fears of discrimination.
29
 
However, some empirical research casts doubts as to the ultimate impact of educational 
decentralisation on the transition out of conflict. It needs to be remembered that educational 
decentralisation is implemented rarely and education systems throughout the world remain highly 
centralised.
30
 Moreover, Dyer and Rose warn that when educational decentralisation is not explicitly 
designed to expand democratic spaces and to nurture a diffused culture of participation at the local 
level, it may simply reinforce local elites.
31
 The development literature confirms that political and 
administrative decentralisation risks entrenching patronage politics.
32
 This may undermine service 
delivery and post-conflict reconstruction and prevent long-term conflict resolution.
33
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Finally, there is widespread agreement that educational decentralisation may ‘reinforce ethnic 
divisions if it is not moderated by strong institutions at the national level’.
34
 This is because only the 
central government can promote essential structural reforms, enforce common standards, ensure a 
balanced distribution of resources and prevent indoctrination and recruitment in schools.
35
 Indeed, 
recent empirical research confirms that local governments in a number of post-conflict societies 
‘exacerbated conflict or, at best, not contributed to peace’.
36
 This may occur when, as a 
consequence of decentralisation, the quality gap between schools serving better off and worse off 
communities widens.
37
 This is the case especially local actors lack the capacity to fulfil their new 
role.
38
 The failure of local government to deliver on promised services and deal with emerging 
conflicts may erode state legitimacy or hamper the very process of decentralisation.
39
  In Jackson’s 
words, ‘effective local government makes conflict less likely whereas ineffective local government 
increases conflict risk’.
40
 But what affects the effectiveness of local government and its ability to 
employ education to foster long-term peace in post-conflict societies?  
The existing literature suggests three core factors shaping local governments’ ability to employ 
education for conflict transformation: the overarching consensus over the aims of education in 
general and of educational decentralisation in particular;
41
 bureaucratic inertia;
42
 and the legacies of 
violent conflict.
43
 However, Lauglo, Bray, Dyer and Rose call for an improved understanding of the 
interaction between political structures and different approaches to educational decentralisation 
through analysis of specific case studies.
44
  
The present article responds to this call by looking at three societies which adopted a constitutional 
and political system broadly identifiable as consociational power-sharing (hereafter, power-sharing): 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia. Power-sharing aims to manage or ameliorate violent 
inter-communal conflict through a combination of elements of shared rule (coalition government, 
mutual vetoes, proportional representation) and of self-rule for the previously warring groups.
45
 
Self-rule may be expressed through a spectrum of autonomy, ranging from non-territorial autonomy 
to territorial autonomy. Wolff observes that territorial self-governance is an increasing common and 
beneficial element of both the theory and the practice of power-sharing,
46
 and finds expression in 
both Northern Ireland and Macedonia. However, power-sharing draws its roots in non-territorial 
forms of self-rule, which tend to be ‘explicitly ethnic’ in being granted to ascriptive ethnic, national 
or religious groups which participated to conflict,
47
 as most obvious in Lebanon. Recent studies 
suggest that the idiosyncrasies of power-sharing affect the implementation of territorial 
decentralisation in favour of non-territorial autonomy.
48
  
Drawing on this literature, the present article proposes two further factors which mediate the power 
of local government to design and deliver educational services contributing to conflict 
transformation: the model of decentralisation adopted in the aftermath of conflict and the decision-
making model at the centre (power-sharing).   
Methods and Cases 
This study is grounded in rich and detailed data collected in the course of fieldwork in Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland and Macedonia in 2012-2013. This includes thirty-three semi-structured interviews 
with politicians, policymakers, experts and activists in the three jurisdictions. Interviewees were 
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selected on the basis of their professional background and expertise on education policy, but also to 
ensure broad representation of all the relevant political and ethnic groups.  
All the interviews were carried out by the author, who is Italian and was between 28 and 30 years 
old when carrying out fieldwork. She has no religious affiliation, but many interviewees assumed she 
was Christian (in Lebanon and Macedonia) or Catholic (in Northern Ireland). This may have affected 
the propensity of certain interviewees to disclose (or hide) their opinion. Language did not affect the 
interviewees, as they were mostly carried out in English (in which she is fluent). The author also 
speaks a little Arabic and French, but no Macedonian or Albanian. All the interviewees were offered 
the opportunity to use an interpreter, but only one of them accepted (Interview 5) whilst the others 
chose to carry out the interview in English. The interviews focused on the challenges and 
opportunities for education policy since the signing of the three peace agreements, and specific 
questions were asked about decentralisation in Lebanon and Macedonia. In Northern Ireland, the 
questions touched on educational changes since devolution. To avoid any blind spots in her 
understanding, the author asked every interviewee for suggestions of sources and issues to be 
examined. Interview data was complemented with a wide collection of newspaper clippings (such as 
The Belfast Telegraph, BBC, The Daily Star and Transitions Online), and government and international 
data and reports.  
Case Selection 
The three case studies were selected according to the most different systems design method of 
comparative research, which is ideally suited to highlight patterns among few case studies.
49
  Due to 
the limited number of case studies, further research should be undertaken before generalising these 
findings to other post-conflict countries.  
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia differ in terms of their key socio-political cleavages (with 
religion at the heart of Lebanon’s war, religion/nationality at the heart of Northern Ireland’s 
Troubles, and language/nationality at the heart of Macedonia’s conflict), of their historical 
experiences and of their regional environments. However, they all experienced violent inter-
communal conflict (the 1975-1990 civil war in Lebanon, the 1968-1998 Troubles in Northern Ireland 
and the 2001 conflict in Macedonia). Following Wolff and Cordell, the conflicts of Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland and Macedonia can be defined as ethnic conflicts, in which ‘the goals of at least one conflict 
party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is 
one of ethnic distinction’.
50
 Moreover, despite the fact that in any society emerging from violence 
‘peace is often insecure, relapses are frequent’,
51
 the three case studies are hailed as successful 
examples of conflict management generally, and as success cases of power-sharing more specifically 
.
52
 Indeed, UCDP data on the number of battle-related deaths since the conclusion of peace 
agreements confirms that Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia ‘have experienced recent and 
severe outbreaks of violence, but are demonstrating clear signs of transitioning towards higher 
levels of peace’.
53
 
Two characteristics make Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia particularly suitable for the 
present comparative analysis of educational decentralisation in post-conflict societies. First, the Taif 
Agreement (TA), Good Friday Agreement (GFA) and Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) established 
or re-established power-sharing to accommodate the previously warring ethnic, national, linguistic 
and religious groups in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia, respectively.  
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Second, the three peace agreements mapped decentralisation as part of the package of institutional 
reforms aiming to ameliorate the conflicts in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia. However, 
the different demographic structure of the three societies, their historical traditions and the 
priorities of external actors contributed to engender different approaches to decentralisation, 
ranging from non-territorial autonomy to devolution, to de-concentration.  
This article suggests that the model of decentralisation implemented in the aftermath of conflict, as 
well as the adoption of power-sharing (and the interaction between these two factors), affects the 
extent to which local governments can design and deliver educational services contributing to 
conflict transformation.  To evaluate this hypothesis, it analyses three specific examples of the 
design and delivery of education services in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia, respectively: 
the reform of the Lebanese University, the establishment of Northern Ireland’s Education and Skills 
Authority, and the rationalisation of Macedonia’s school network.  
Lebanon: Reforms of the Lebanese University  
Controversies over the Lebanese University since 1989 provide a unique vantage point to evaluate 
the relationship between central and local actors in the context of power-sharing and extensive non-
territorial autonomy. The Lebanese University was founded in Beirut in 1951. In 1977, at the height 
of the civil war, Christian Education Minister Camille Chamoun signed a decree establishing a second 
branch of the Lebanese University to allow all students to attend university in a city divided along 
Christian-Muslim lines.
54
 Muslim politicians protested the decision on the grounds that ‘dividing the 
university [meant] dividing the country’.
55
  
The Taif Agreement (TA) concluding 15 years of brutal civil war, vaguely suggested that ‘the 
conditions of the Lebanese University shall be reformed’, implying an intent to fully decentralise or 
fully re-centralise the University.
56
 The re-centralisation of the University into a single, Beirut-based 
campus, in which students from different backgrounds would study together could have provided 
opportunities for dialogue and mutual knowledge, ensured uniform teaching standards and 
equalised the long-term opportunities of students. Conversely, the full de-centralisation of the 
University into several autonomous institutions located across Lebanon may have enhanced 
transparency and efficiency in the management of resources, as well as promoting a more efficient 
educational provision grounded in local demands. 
In fact, almost three decades on, the Lebanese University remains a hybrid actor: it retains a 
centralised administrative structure but dozens of de facto decentralised campuses keep 
‘mushrooming’ throughout Lebanon.
57
 Even the parties that initially opposed its fragmentation, 
subsequently started claiming that the separate branches allowed the ‘sharing’ of resources and ‘for 
all parts of the country to develop’.
58
The impact of the failure to reform the Lebanese University 
upon long-term peace is unclear but anecdotal evidence suggests that its different branches cater to 
a largely homogeneous student population and employ staff and teachers from the same 
confessional and political community. This does not promote the sustained and positive personal 
contact which fosters reconciliation.
59
 In fact, an interviewee reflected that ‘it is like apartheid’.
60
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This article hypothesises that power-sharing and specific models of decentralisation affect the 
provision of educational services, and specifically the contribution of local actors to an education 
conducive to peace. Did they do so in Lebanon?  
The TA re-established power-sharing after the 15-years hiatus of the civil war. It also entrenched the 
non-territorial autonomy of Lebanon’s 18 confessional communities (which retain separate personal 
status laws), and provided for rather limited territorial autonomy: ‘expanded administrative 
decentralisation’.
61
 Power-sharing provisions were immediately enforced under the Syrian aegis. This 
was not the case for territorial autonomy: in subsequent decades, the lack of a clear division of 
responsibility with the central government, excessive central control, lack of fiscal autonomy and 
weak local administrative capabilities prevented Lebanese municipalities from assuming the 
responsibilities they have on paper, including responsibilities for the management and delivery of 
education services.
62
  
Kerr and Hamdan suggest that power-sharing itself constrained the implementation of territorial 
decentralisation in favour of non-territorial autonomy. They propose that Lebanon’s power-sharing 
leads to segmental political parties (rather than the government) controlling political, administrative 
and fiscal matters. By accessing state resources and redistributing them to their clientelistic 
networks, central-level politicians maintain strong local power-bases in their traditional 
strongholds.
63
 Education is part and parcel of these dynamics, as communal and political actors such 
as Hezbollah draw considerable legitimacy and support from their provision of schooling in fragile 
and remote locations. As an education expert put it, the ‘weakness of the formal administration, 
gives way to exercise power informally’.
64
  In this sense, the proliferation of branches of the 
Lebanese University allows Lebanon’s political parties to instrumentalise this state institution to 
promote their ‘factional, communal’ interests.
65
 As a consequence, an interviewee argued that ‘each 
leader wants a piece of’ the university and this explains the political opposition to full re-
centralisation of the Lebanese University.
66
   
Yet, central political parties also oppose the full administrative decentralisation of the Lebanese 
University into several autonomous institutions. This is at least partly because of the delicate politics 
of power-sharing. Lebanon’s power-sharing is premised on the sharing of high-level governmental 
posts among Muslims and Christians, and among the 18 different confessional communities. 
According to these quotas, the President of the Lebanese University is Shiite, whilst the positions of 
University Deans are distributed among Muslims and Christians. The dismemberment of the 
university would mean that ‘we as Shia would lose one very interesting post’
67
and would require a 
major redistribution of high-level posts among Lebanon’s political parties and communities. ‘Fear of 
imbalance between the communities’,
68
 and the desire to avoid complex and potentially inciendiary 
negotiations, contributes to explain the stalemate over reform of the Lebanese University. 
This brief overview corroborates the hypothesis that power-sharing and the specific model of 
decentralisation adopted by a post-conflict society affect the scope for education reforms conducive 
to conflict transformation. The case of Lebanon suggests that power-sharing may complicate the 
implementation of territorial decentralisation where there is a strong tradition of non-territorial 
autonomy. Territorial decentralisation may be opposed by political parties which benefit from 
extreme non-territorial autonomy because it could reduce their access to state resources and their 
ability to redistribute them to their local clients.
69
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The case of Lebanon also suggests that the interaction between power-sharing and non-territorial 
decentralisation complicated the formulation and implementation of education policies conducive to 
conflict transformation. As mentioned, both the full re-centralisation and the full decentralisation of 
the state university may have fostered long-term peace. However, the status quo, consisting of a  
hierarchical and centralised administrative structure, combined with fragmented de facto 
autonomous regional branches, has ambiguous consequences for long-term conflict transformation. 
On the one hand, it may foster short-term stability by entrenching wider power-sharing structures 
and reproducing existing patterns of clientelism.
70
 Weiler also suggests that the fragmentation of 
university institutions ‘allows the state to diffuse the sources of conflict’ as well as to contain and 
monitor dissent more efficiently.
71
 On the other hand, it also perpetuates an inefficient and corrupt 
administration of state resources and deprives students of opportunities for contact with others who 
belong to different confessional and political groups. 
Northern Ireland: From Education and Skills Authority to Education 
Authority  
There is widespread agreement that Northern Ireland’s education system is not cost effective due to 
the existence of four parallel school sectors: state controlled, Catholic maintained, integrated 
schools, and Irish-medium schools.
72
 In 2012, the Department of Education confirmed that there 
were about 85,000 surplus places in schools, equivalent to 150 schools.
73
 This is problematic in the 
context of an increasingly ‘strict budget’ allocated by London.
74
 Separate schools catering for 
different communities in Northern Ireland have also been accused of hampering rather than 
encouraging reconciliation by preventing contact between children of different backgrounds.
75
 More 
recently, it was found that the quality of a child’s educational experience depended on communal 
background, with Catholic maintained schools (catering for the Nationalist and Catholic community) 
generally providing a better quality of education than state controlled schools (catering for the 
Protestant and Unionist community). It also depended on socio-economic conditions: pupils entitled 
to free school meals were twice as likely as more affluent pupils not to achieve five good GCSEs in 
2013.
76
Finally, it depended on the zone of residence: whilst pupils in Belfast could access educational 
psychologists within 30 days, in more rural constituencies it could take up to a year.
77
 This disparity  
has important indirect consequences for the peace process: underperforming schools were 
concentrated ‘in Protestant loyalist working class areas’, and this reportedly ‘has the potential to 
destabilise our community’.
78
  
The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) did not address the complex structure of schooling in Northern 
Ireland. However, at the same time, Westminster promoted a Review of Public Administration to 
create ‘a two-tier model of public administration’, with a regional tier in charge of policy formulation 
and municipal actors in charge of service delivery.
79
 The review was ostensibly informed by 
principles of subsidiarity, equality and good relations, common boundaries and strong local 
government.
80
 Its primary implication for the education sector was the ambition, according to then 
Northern Ireland Office Minister Ian Pearson to effect ‘significant reductions in the number of public 
bodies’, including those administering education.
81
 It resulted in the plan to establish an Education 
and Skills Authority (ESA) to replace the existing plurality of administrative bodies, including five 
Education and Library Boards managing state controlled schools), the Council for Catholic 
Maintained Education (supporting Catholic maintained schools, the Northern Ireland Council for 
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Integrated Education (managing integrated schools) and the Council for Irish-Medium Schools 
(Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta, supporting Irish-medium schools).   
As Knox puts it, ESA was expected to ‘rationalise the plethora of education quangos, plan in a unified 
way the future education estate and save £20 million per year in so doing’.
82
 Beyond fostering 
economies, the centralisation of educational administration into ESA was expected to support 
peace-building by furthering collaboration (or even fusion) among schools catering to different 
sectors of the community. Policies like Area Planning and the Entitlement Framework encouraged 
the pooling of resources and inter-school collaborations.
83
 However, the different legal and 
administrative frameworks regulating each education sector posed often insurmountable obstacles 
to collaboration and fusion across communal lines.
84
 One interviewee suggested that by unifying the 
legal and administrative structure of the four educations sectors, ESA would generate more 
opportunities for sustained and positive contact among children of different backgrounds (shared 
education).
85
  
Over the following decade, ESA became ‘one of the most expensive yet non-existent bodies in the 
history of Northern Ireland's power-sharing Assembly’.
86
 After years of political wrangling between 
Nationalist and Unionist parties and over £17 million invested its establishment, in April 2014, 
Education Minister John O’Dowd signalled the ‘death knell’ for ESA.
87
 Instead, the Education 
Authority came into being in April 2015 and simply replaced the five Education and Library Boards 
that previously administered state controlled education.
88
 The EA’s statutory duty to support shared 
education may be a step towards more sustained and positive contact between children of different 
communal backgrounds. However, interviewees point out that the merging of the five Education and 
Library Boards may also entrench ‘the status quo and the planned separate development of our 
schools’
89
and ‘may reinforce the sectarian divide’.
90
  
This article suggests that power sharing and devolution affect the ability of local actors to design and 
deliver transformative education services. The GFA established power-sharing between the 
representatives of the Unionist community and of the Nationalist community. It also mapped the re-
establishment of a devolved Northern Ireland Assembly as ‘the prime source of authority in respect 
of all devolved responsibilities’ (including education), but did not envisage decentralisation of 
educational responsibilities to the municipal level.
91
 This model of devolved administration affected 
the formulation and delivery of education services, which generally excluded municipal actors, 
despite the recommendations of the Review of Public Administration.  
The establishment of local power-sharing and restoration of devolution in 2007 impacted on plans 
for the creation of ESA in two main respects. First, as a major legislative bill, the bill to establish ESA 
required cross-community consensus.
92
 Controversies focused on the scope for the promotion of 
integrated and Irish-medium education through ESA,
93
 on the autonomy of grammar schools,
94
 on 
the effective scope for rationalisation of the existing school network, and – most substantially – over 
representation on the ESA executive board. 
Second, Westminster had conceived the ESA executive board as a small body of technocrats.
95
 
However, the devolved administration quickly established that ESA’s executive board should 
‘encompass a wide range of education interests’.
96
 This came to mean politicians,
97
who would 
‘balance out the control of the minister of education’,
98
 as well as representatives of the main 
Churches (as owners of the school buildings).
99
 The integrated and Irish-medium sectors also 
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demanded representation.
100
 It appeared that’s, as Knox puts it, ‘the existing education quangos, so 
often criticised for lack of political accountability’ were being ‘replaced by a super-quango’.
101
  
Despite extensive compromises over political and religious representation, Unionist parties 
remained staunchly opposed to the establishment of ESA. A prominent politician argues that this 
was a challenge to Sinn Fein’s ‘dogmatic’ approach to education policy
102
 but others suggest that it 
was in retaliation for the abolishment of academic selection at age 11.
103
 Ultimately, a policymaker 
reflected that ‘in the absence of trust we simply didn’t have the cross-party support to make 
progress’.
104
 By mid-2014, the plan to establish ESA was abandoned in favour of the more modest 
Education Authority, which would simply replace the five Education and Library Boards that 
previously administered state controlled education.
105
 
This effectively eliminated the little territorial decentralisation of state controlled education which 
existed previously, in keeping with the GFA’s emphasis on devolution to Belfast rather than on 
decentralisation to municipal or sub-regional actors. Moreover, the composition of the EA board 
reflected and reproduced wider structures of power-sharing. The board is composed from eight 
Church representatives (four representatives of the Protestant Churches from the Transferors 
Representative Council and four representatives of the Catholic Church from the Trustees of Catholic 
Maintained Schools), eight political representatives (shared proportionally to electoral votes 
according to the D’Hondt formula), and one member representing each of the integrated, Irish-
medium, voluntary grammar and controlled grammar sectors.
106
  
This brief analysis of efforts to establish an overarching Education and Skills Authority in Northern 
Ireland illustrates clearly the constraints experienced by local actors in promoting transformative 
education reforms in a post-conflict society. They relate to two factors. First, the model of devolved 
administration adopted by Northern Ireland set the stage for a full devolution of education policy 
and management from Westminster to Stormont, but not for a decentralisation of educational 
responsibilities to municipal or sub-regional actors. Thus, municipalities remain marginal both in the 
definition of education policy and in the delivery of education services in Northern Ireland.
107
 In fact, 
the limited sub-regional decentralisation of state controlled education was reversed with the 
establishment of the EA.  
Second, Northern Ireland’s power-sharing constrained the scope for a full centralisation of 
educational provision into a single ESA. Consensus decision-making and the reproduction of wider 
patterns of proportional representation at all levels of the administration meant that the equally 
funded separate education sectors catering to different communities, remain key to the organisation 
of educational policy and management. In other words, similarly to Lebanon, in Northern Ireland, 
non-territorial autonomy is paramount when considering the design and delivery of education 
services. 
How does the failure to establish ESA (and the establishment of the more modest EA) impact on 
Northern Ireland’s conflict? It is clear that the EA board reproduces and legitimises wider structures 
of power-sharing,
108
 perhaps entrenching its short-term stability and legitimacy. As mentioned, the 
EA’s statutory duty to support shared education may be a step towards more sustained and positive 
contact across communities. However, the EA also establishes the state controlled sector as one 
among a variety of equally legitimate state-funded education providers catering for different 
communities, rather than as the default state provision. In this sense, some interviewees reflected 
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that it encourages the emergence of a specific ‘Protestant’ ethos in a sector which had previously 
portrayed itself ‘as we just provide state education’.
109
 This ‘may reinforce the sectarian divide’.
110
  
Macedonia: Rationalisation of the School Network 
One of the core demands of the Albanian insurgency during Macedonia’s 2001 conflict was the 
expansion of the right to mother tongue education at all levels, and state financing for institutions 
teaching in languages other than Macedonian.
111
 Indeed, there is widespread agreement that the 
pre-2001 centralised educational system did not respond to the specific needs of local communities 
in regard to mother tongue education and to the opening and closing of schools.
112
 Macedonia’s 
school network was built in the 1960s and 1970s and did not adapt to changing demographics. by 
the early 2000s, up to 30 percent of schools had less than 20 students and were understaffed.
113
 
These were largely in rural areas, inhabited predominantly by ethnic Macedonians. Yet, the urban 
areas –particularly the municipalities inhabited by ethnic Albanians and Roma - experienced rapid 
demographic growth. As a result, up to 30 percent of primary schools were overcrowded and 
operated in two or even three daily shifts.
114
 Funding was also allocated on the basis of class 
numbers rather than on the basis of pupil numbers, so per capita spending on education differed 
markedly across schools and municipalities, to the advantage of municipalities inhabited primarily by 
ethnic Macedonians.
115
  
To address the demands of the Albanian insurgency, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) 
entrenched the right to mother tongue education at primary and secondary school level, and 
provided for state funding for university education ‘in languages spoken by at least 20 percent of the 
population of Macedonia’.
116
 How would this help peace-building? It is established that mother 
tongue and multilingual education are important instruments for transition out of conflict, 
particularly when linguistic cleavages are politically salient.
117
 Thus, in the Macedonian case the 
fulfilment of the OFA’s promise for language rights, and the narrowing of the quality gap in 
education, remain key to the stability of the peace process. 
The OFA also established power-sharing and mapped extensive territorial decentralisation. The 
negotiators believed this would help conflict management by strengthening municipalities, as the 
unit of government ‘closer to the people’ and which best ‘reflected the ethnic composition of the 
population’.
118
 
The 2002 Law on Local Self-Government tasked local governments with responsibilities like founding 
schools, owning school buildings, paying staff salaries, opening and closing schools, and appointing 
school directors.
119
 Effectively, it made municipalities responsible for granting access to mother 
tongue education in their territory. Lyon reports that, according to municipal education officers, 
decentralisation made it easier for municipalities to open new classes teaching in Albanian or 
Turkish.
120
 Certainly the proportion of children studying in the Albanian and Turkish languages and 
the number of schools offering instruction in Albanian and Turkish increased considerably since 
2001.
121
  
Yet, some substantial restrictions remained to the opening of classes in the languages of 
Macedonia’s ethnic minorities, including requirements for a minimum number of students and 
frequent resistance to employing new staff members.
122
 Moreover, the central government retained 
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most of the ultimate decision-making powers, as well as ultimate financial control.
123
 The Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry of Finance needed to approve the opening (and closing) of any new class 
and school in Macedonia.
124
 Municipalities lacked formal channels to influence the government: they 
did not have legislative powers, they were not represented in Skopje, and even the municipal 
association was largely marginalised by the central government.
125
 Thus, most interviewees agreed 
that whereas the education system was officially decentralised, decision-making remained highly 
hierarchical.
126
 An international expert explained that it is ‘a hybrid situation where municipalities 
are in charge of the physical part… and the staffing, the budget for the schools and the contents part 
[i.e., the curriculum] is centralised’.
127
  
This impacted directly on municipal initiatives to rationalise the school network to meet 
demographic pressures. Lyon reports that in 2009 only three out of nine municipal initiatives to 
rationalise the educational network were implemented successfully.
128
 In 2008, the World Bank 
confirmed that up to 87 percent of secondary schools still operated in double or triple shifts.
129
 
Indeed, municipalities were often caught between a rock and a hard place, with rising numbers of 
ethnic Albanian students demanding Albanian-medium education, but without the funding to open 
new classes.
130
 In fact, there was anecdotal evidence of municipal requests for new classes being 
rejected by the Education Minister.
131
 For example, Lyon mentions the high profile case of Albanian-
medium classes in the municipality of Struga, which were approved by the ethnic Albanian deputy 
education minister but later declared illegal by the ethnic Macedonian education minister.
132
 The 
continuing disparity in service provision affects the quality of education for minority communities: 
lessons are shorter when students attend school in shifts and class sizes remain extremely large (up 
to 40 pupils in Albanian-language classes).
133
  
This article suggests that the model of decentralisation adopted after conflict, and power-sharing, 
affect local actors’ ability to design and deliver educational services which contribute to long-term 
conflict management. The extremely limited agency of municipal actors, and their failure to 
decisively promote those education reforms which would contribute to long-term conflict 
management (specifically a more rational school network) are partially explained by the model of 
decentralisation implemented since 2001. Despite the OFA’s ambitious promises, it appears that 
decentralisation in Macedonia amounts primarily to the delegation of central responsibilities to the 
local levels. Lyons suggests that Macedonia’s approach is simply a ‘de-concentration of central 
government’.
134
  
Lyons also suggests that Macedonia’s ‘de-concentration of central government’ helped replicate 
‘consociational power-sharing locally’.
135
 It did so through decision-making procedures governed by 
proportionality, by weighted majority rules and by inclusive forums like the Committees for Inter-
Community Relations.
136
 The drawing of municipal boundaries to maximise ethnic homogeneity also 
helped embed the new political representatives of ethnic communities on the local level
137
 whilst 
reinforcing patterns of patronage.
138
  
This hampered flexible change in the school network. The Ministry of Education took up to three 
years to respond to municipal applications.
139
 Moreover, ministerial decisions on capital funding 
were not ‘very transparent’, and some sources suggest that municipalities governed by the majority 
parties were advantaged.
140
 Conversely, as in Northern Ireland, ‘no politician wants to close a 
school’.
141
 This was the case particularly when the rationalisation of the education network entailed 
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a ‘decision concerning the redistribution of resources from under-populated (predominantly 
Macedonian) areas in the east of the country to over-populated (predominantly ethnic Albanian) 
areas in the north and west’.
142
 As an international observer summarised it, closing a school often 
meant ‘losing out to the other community’.
143
 Ultimately, interviewees reported that the very parties 
participating to the power-sharing government did not trust each other and did not cooperate 
effectively in the educational realm.
144
 An ethnic division of labour emerged both at the central 
government and at the local government level: ethnic Albanian officers dealt with Albanian schools 
and classes whilst ethnic Macedonia officials dealt with Macedonian schools and classes.
145
  
This corroborates the hypothesis that the ability of local government to promote conflict-
management through the education sector is mediated by two factors: the model of 
decentralisation adopted in the aftermath of conflict and the decision-making model at the centre. 
Lyon suggests that perhaps territorial decentralisation ‘facilitated heterogeneous policymaking in 
the delivery (but not design) of educational services’ in Macedonia.
146
 The brief overview above 
suggests that –even when considering only the delivery of education services - the power of local 
government is severely constrained by the model of decentralisation adopted in Macedonia: de-
concentration to the local level (rather than devolution). Here, even the change of a school’s name 
needs to be approved by the Minister of Education, so ‘you cannot say this is full decentralisation’.
147
   
As in the other cases, power-sharing interacts in complex ways with de-concentration of central 
government in Macedonia. Power-sharing appeared to be particularly conducive to enhancing the 
non-territorial autonomy of previously warring communities, as expressed through language rights, 
the emergence of parties as communal champions, and the informal division of labour between 
ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian politicians and bureaucrats.  
In fact, despite their many constraints, local actors succeeded in contributing to conflict 
management through education reform: the increasing provision of mother tongue education at all 
levels is an important success. More ambiguously, recent analyses of power-sharing through the 
lenses of political economy suggest that clientelism may help legitimise the new central political 
system when it benefits the parties in power.
148
 In this sense, the emergence of local political parties 
as ethnic champions, the reproduction of the decision-making patterns of power-sharing, and the 
entrenchment of a political economy of power-sharing on the local level may also help the short-
term stability and legitimacy of the new political system. However, as a local observer reflected, the 
continuing tension between local demands for more school places in areas inhabited by minority 
communities, limited municipal capabilities to satisfy these demands, and the constraints placed by 
central government resulted in education being ‘a source of tension’ rather than an instrument for 
conflict management).
149
 
Conclusion  
The existing literature suggests that education can contribute to transition out of violent conflict by 
delivering badly needed peace dividends, providing new generations with an understanding of past 
violence, redressing the inequalities and grievances that motivated conflict and reproducing and 
legitimising the wider socio-political system.
150
 In the cases of Lebanon, Northern Ireland and 
Macedonia, education reforms aiming at sustaining the wider peace process focused on redressing 
existing inequalities in access and quality of education (in Northern Ireland and Macedonia) and on 
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reforming identity-sensitive aspects of schooling (like mother-tongue education in Macedonia and 
the fragmented Lebanese University). The three peace agreements also mapped educational 
decentralisation as an expression of the wider self-government of previously warring communities. 
The brief analysis of educational initiatives in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia suggests 
that, whilst full educational decentralisation may in fact promote genuine conflict management as 
postulated by international donors, the implementation of decentralisation in post-conflict societies 
faces several constraints, which hamper its conflict-mitigating potential. This study hypothesised 
that two constraints are particularly salient in post-conflict societies: the model of decentralisation 
adopted after conflict, and the model of central decision-making (power-sharing). 
Table 2 provides a summary of the characteristics of each case study, including information about 
the conflict and peace agreement; the key constraints to each education reform; and the outcome of 
each initiative. The following remarks will draw some general conclusions from the comparison 
between the case studies.
 
Table 2: Summary 
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In Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia, the establishment of power-sharing affected local 
government’s ability to employ education for peace in two main respects. First, as Lyon reflects, 
local government reproduced the central structures of power-sharing at the municipal level,
151
 as 
well as within the administrative bodies in charge of education services (such as the management of 
the Lebanese University and the executive board of Northern Ireland’s Education Authority). In this 
sense, local governments may foster the short term stability and legitimacy of the post-conflict 
political system.  
Second, power-sharing generally provided for extensive communal autonomy. In fact, it may 
enhance non-territorial autonomy in post-conflict societies. This analysis suggests that non-
territorial and territorial forms of autonomy interact in complex ways, and impact on the design and 
delivery of educational provision. For example, the stalemate over reform of the Lebanese University 
is at least partially due to the desire to avoid lengthy and complex renegotiations over the 
representation of Lebanon’s communities in the upper levels of the state administration. In 
Northern Ireland, the failure of ESA may be attributed to the desire to retain separate education 
sectors as embodiments of the autonomous local communities. Similarly, in Macedonia, municipal 
decisions to open or close schools are often constrained by wider considerations about the 
distribution of central power among ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians. Whilst this finding is 
limited to the education sector, further research should be carried out in the ways in which 
territorial and non-territorial autonomy interact in the presence of central power-sharing, and on 
their impact upon other non-political institutions. 
The model of decentralisation adopted in the aftermath of conflict also shapes the power of local 
government. The weak territorial decentralisation of Lebanon is balanced by a strong emphasis on 
the non-territorial autonomy of the previously warring confessional communities. As mentioned, 
Lebanon’s strong tradition of non-territorial autonomy constrains the scope for devolution of power 
to municipalities. Similarly to the Lebanese case, Northern Ireland and Macedonia also grant some 
non-territorial autonomy to their previously warring national and ethnic communities. In Northern 
Ireland, the devolution of powers from London to Belfast was not a prelude to further 
decentralisation to the municipal level: in fact, it led to the centralisation of policy and service 
delivery in Belfast. In Macedonia, territorial decentralisation, a mainstay of the OFA, appears to have 
simply resulted in delegation of some limited central responsibilities to the local level, as central 
ministries are required to approve even the minutest local decisions on education. An expert 
suggested that perhaps central politicians ‘are centralising the control and only decentralising the 
blame [for failed policies]’.
152
 This corroborates Weiler’s suggestion that political rhetoric about 
decentralisation may represent a key tool to enhance central legitimacy and manage conflict.
153
  
How do local actors contribute to conflict management through education in this context? This 
paper suggests that rather than resting on local government, communal self-government was often 
fulfilled through non-territorial forms of autonomy. Separate educational sectors catering for 
different communities in post-conflict societies are an expression of such autonomy and are 
instrumental to the legitimacy and stability of power-sharing in the short term.
154
 However, 
decentralisation did not erode the zero-sum politics over educational reform: it reproduced 
politicised debates over education locally and entrenched political parties as communal champions 
also at the municipal level. The political polarisation along the lines of previously warring parties 
questions the sustainability of a long-term peace process. 
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Furthermore, local governments did not challenge inefficient service delivery, despite the theoretical 
expectation that they would do so. In fact, they entrenched it when it resulted from a history of 
parallel provision and from clientelistic networks. If power-sharing is sustained by a political 
economy of corruption and clientelism, as Hass and Ottmann maintain, this may be beneficial to the 
short-term political stability of post-conflict societies which adopt power-sharing.
155
 However, this 
does not necessarily enhance long-term conflict resolution or state legitimacy.
156
 Indeed, the failure 
of local actors to deliver on promises of cost-reducing reforms may delegitimise them on the long-
term, particularly once international funding dries up in the decades after the conclusion of a peace 
agreement.
157
  
In sum, a comparative analysis of the decentralisation of educational provision in Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland and Macedonia confirms Jackson and Scott’s observation that local governments did not 
decisively contribute to peace through education.
158
 It questions the most optimistic promises of 
decentralisation: in the three case studies, autonomy did not foster transparent decision-making, did 
not enhance efficient and rational service delivery, did not erode clientelist networks, nor did it 
remedy existing discrepancies in educational quality across regions or communities. Most often, the 
constraints of power-sharing and of different models of decentralisation led to de facto fragmented 
education systems, in which children belonging to different communities or coming from different 
regions have access to a different quality of education, and in which contact between students from 
different communities is limited. This may allow local communities to protect and nurture their 
separate cultures and identities. It certainly furthers the political equality and autonomy of 
previously warring groups, promoting short-term conflict management. However, it does not directly 
promote the long-term transformation of the conflict. 
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